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Incentives for Spatially Coordinated Land Conservation: A 







Land conservation is a tool extensively used by governments and environmental organizations 
to obtain a multitude of environmental benefits. The largest land conservation program in the 
U.S. is the USDA‘s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). It pays farmers to retire land in crop 
production in favor of conservation measures that will achieve environmental objectives such as 
reducing soil erosion, improving air and water quality, and providing wildlife habitat.  Over 33 
million acres were enrolled in CRP programs as of September of 2009.  The efficient allocation 
of funds is a subject of interest to economists in that annual expenditures for land conservation 
range in the billions of dollars.  An extensive economic literature has emerged analyzing the 
cost-effectiveness of conservation programs in achieving environmental objectives.  See 
Claassen et al. (2008) for a review of U.S. conservation programs and previous research. 
 
The marginal benefit of a conservation effort is often small until some threshold level of 
conservation has been reached.  For example, the population of a species may not be viable 
when contiguous habitat is below some minimum acreage .  Conservation efforts resulting in 
the creation contiguous habitat of a size below   would provide no environmental benefits in 
terms of improving the viability of the species (see Figure 1). 
 
Examples of such ―threshold effects‖ considered in the economic literature include the effect of 
habitat fragmentation on bird and mammal species (Lewis and Plantinga, 2007; Parkhurst and 
Shogren, 2007; Parkhurst et al., 2002), and the effect of water quality on fish populations (Wu, 
et al., 2000).   The marginal benefit of conserving a parcel of land may depend not only upon 
the parcel‘s characteristics, but on the spatial pattern of conservation among neighboring 
parcels given the presence of threshold effects.  The concern is that ignoring threshold effects 
will result in an allocation of conservation funding that is spatially overly dispersed, as 
demonstrated by Wu and Boggess (1999). 
 
Wu et al. (2000) consider a conservation issue prominent in the western United States: habitat 
enhancement for steelhead trout, a salmonid fish species.  The authors identify a threshold 
effect in water temperature‘s impact on the steelhead abundance in the John Day River fishery 
in eastern Oregon: stream temperatures should not exceed 18
○ C.  Measures that lower stream 
temperature one or two degrees when stream temperature is above 20
○ C have little effect on 
steelhead abundance.  The authors find that the equal allocation of funds across sub-basins to 
improve stream habitat  would tend to be inefficient because marginal benefits vary significantly 
depending on the condition of surrounding habitat.  In the extreme case, benefits might even be 




                                                 
18 The author is a graduate student in the department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at Oregon State 
University. Western Economics Forum, Fall 2009 
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Figure 1. Benefit per Acre (BPA) of Contiguous Habitat Acreage (H) 
 
An incentive mechanism proposed in the literature to encourage spatially coordinated 
conservation is the agglomeration bonus. It awards landowners bonus payments for the 
conservation of adjacent portions of land (Parkhurst and Shogren, 2008; Parkhurst and 
Shogren, 2007).  In an experimental study, Parkhurst and Shogren (2007) found that groups of 
four players in a coordination game with an agglomeration bonus mechanism were able to 
achieve desired spatial configurations of land conservation (e.g., a wildlife corridor or core 
habitat) with over 90% efficiency.  While these experimental results are encouraging, they were 
limited to the context of conserving endangered species habitat that overlapped several parcels 
of land.  Furthermore, each player had exact knowledge of the other players‘ opportunity costs, 
and the total incentives paid to conserved land were disproportionately large.
19 
 
Real-world applications of the agglomeration bonus are rare.  One is Oregon‘s Conservation 
Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), established in 1998 with the goal of assisting the 
recovery of salmon and trout species by creating riparian buffers along stream habitat.  The 
program includes a provision that awards a one-time ―Cumulative Impact Incentive Bonus‖ 
(CIIB) wherever at least 50 percent of any 5 mile section of streambed is enrolled in the CREP 
(USDA 1998).  In a 1998 survey of potential CREP participants, approximately 76% indicated a 
willingness to work with neighbors toward enrolling contiguous stream miles (Kingsbury, 1999).  
One reason cited by landowners for not wishing to take advantage of the bonus program was 
the perception that it would require a large investment in time to coordinate with neighbors.  
During the past decade CIIB awards in Oregon have not been extensive.  However, the 
incentive has proven successful in encouraging CREP participants who have enrolled without 
bonus compensation to promote the program to neighbors who can put them above the 50% 
threshold required for CIIB eligibility (Sundseth, 2009). 
 
Incomplete information is a frequent impediment to the design of effective incentive 
mechanisms.  Regarding the agglomeration bonus, its functionality is dependent on landowners‘ 
knowledge of their neighbors‘ willingness to participate in conservation.  For example, consider 
                                                 
19 In the 2007 study, incentives totaling $1,168 were paid to four players who conserved the desired configuration of 
core habitat, while the forgone rent (i.e. opportunity cost) on that portion of land totaled only $192.  From a cost-
benefit perspective, it would be preferable to simply make a take-it-or-leave-it offer of less than $1,168 for the 
desired core habitat. 
BPA 
HT 
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a farmer for whom the bonus level of compensation (paid to contiguous conservation) exceeds 
rents from agriculture, and suppose his agricultural rents are higher than some base-level 
compensation (paid to non-contiguous conservation).  His payoff from enrolling in the 
conservation program may be positive or negative depending on whether the pattern of his 
neighbors‘ enrollment is sufficient to warrant bonus compensation.  Hence, the farmer‘s 
expected payoff is a function of each neighbor‘s probability of enrolling.  The farmer takes on 
risk by enrolling because his payoff could be negative.  If information about neighbors‘ 
willingness to participate is limited, he may forego participation even when he and his neighbors 
would mutually benefit from enrolling as a group. 
 
The above example illustrates a significant limitation to the agglomeration bonus mechanism as 
it has been represented in the recent literature: the agreement to enroll is binding on both the 
landowner and regulator.  The agglomeration bonus literature has not examined the potential for 
conditional agreements to overcome the informational requirements necessary to induce 
spatially coordinated land conservation.  The real-world applicability of the agglomeration bonus 
has likely been constrained by its strong information requirements.  The modification to the 
agglomeration bonus mechanism proposed in this paper improves its applicability by limiting 
landowners‘ information requirements to knowledge of their own opportunity costs and 
eliminating the need for landowners to coordinate their enrollment decisions. 
 
Landowner Responses to Voluntary Incentives 
 
Predicting a landowner‘s response to an incentive such as a subsidy from the USDA‘s 
Conservation Reserve Program can be complex.  Underlying the landowner‘s decision to accept 
or reject such a subsidy is the quality (i.e. productivity) of his land, and by extension, the stream 
of rents he can earn from its highest and best use.  Two factors that introduce complexity to 
predicting a landowner‘s response to an incentive are the long term commitment inherent to 
most conservation programs (the minimum CRP contract is 10 years) and the individual 
characteristics of the landowner. 
 
A landowner‘s calculation of expected opportunity cost under a long-term commitment will 
incorporate his current rents as well as expectations of the levels and prices of future inputs and 
outputs.  A group of landowners with similar parcels of land are likely to form variable 
expectations about the proceeding 10 to 15 years.  A landowner‘s willingness to enroll in a 
conservation program is also likely to depend on his personal characteristics.  Conservation 
payments provide a relatively predictable stream of rents compared to crop production and a 
landowner‘s calculation of expected opportunity cost depends on his risk profile.
20  Due to such 
human heterogeneity, a fragmented response to an incentive is possible even where land rents 
and characteristics exhibit little heterogeneity. 
 
The agglomeration bonus attempts to overcome fragmented responses by creating a positive 
network externality among neighboring landowners (Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007).  It requires 
each landowner to perform what can be a complex task: to incorporate expectations of 
neighbors‘ responses into his own enrollment decision.  Each landowner‘s expected payoff from 
enrolling in a conservation program is a function of his expected opportunity cost and 
expectations about his neighbors‘ enrollment decisions (which are equally complex).  For 
                                                 
20 For example, Parks and Kramer (1995) found that older landowners were more likely to enroll land in the 
Wetlands Reserve Program. Western Economics Forum, Fall 2009 
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reasons discussed in the above paragraph, predicting the response of any particular landowner 
to an incentive can be difficult even where land characteristics are observable. 
 
Unless the agglomeration bonus is very large or small relative to opportunity costs, each 
landowner is likely to face some degree of uncertainty about his neighbors‘ willingness to enroll 
their lands.  Where a large number of landowners are involved and/or communication among 
landowners is poor, the ability of an agglomeration bonus to induce coordinated land 
conservation is likely to be limited.  The following section proposes a modification to the 
agglomeration bonus that eliminates the need for landowners to form expectations about others‘ 
willingness to enroll. 
 
A Conditional Agglomeration Bonus 
 
Asking landowners to predict neighbors‘ responses to an incentive is unnecessary when 
landowners‘ agreements to enroll are binding if and only if a desired pattern of enrollment is 
achieved (e.g.,   contiguous acres).  A conditional agglomeration bonus (CAB) program would 
pay compensation only where the desired pattern of enrollment occurs.  As represented in 
Figure 2 below, a regulator would offer some level of compensation ( ) to landowners and 
observe the spatial pattern conditional enrollment.  Where the desired pattern of enrollment 
does not occur, the landowner is released from his obligation to enroll land and the regulator is 
released from his obligation to compensate the landowner.  Assuming zero transaction costs, 
landowner   will conditionally enroll in the program whenever his opportunity cost is less than 
the CAB incentive because in that case his expected payoff   is always greater than or equal to 
zero: 
 
(1)  . 
 
Where   denotes the CAB bonus payment, landowner ’s opportunity cost of enrolling is , 
and   is the probability that his neighbors‘ enrollment will be sufficient to generate the 
regulator‘s desired pattern of conservation. 
 
Under the CAB program a landowner‘s expected payoff remains a function of his neighbors‘ 
opportunity costs; they affect the probability that the agreement to enroll will become binding.  
However, information about neighbors‘ willingness to enroll (i.e. ) is no longer relevant to a 
landowner‘s enrollment decision.  The probability   affects only the magnitude of the expected 
payoff.  The sign of the expected payoff, which determines whether or not landowner   will 




Figure 2 below demonstrates the landowner‘s enrollment decision and payoff structure under a 
CAB program.  Initially, the incentive   is offered.  If  is less than landowner ‘s 
opportunity cost, then the offer is rejected and the payoff is zero.  If landowner ‘s opportunity 
cost is less than  then the offer is conditionally accepted.  Finally, if an accepting 
landowner is part of the desired spatial pattern of conservation he is enrolled in the program 
obtaining a payoff of . 
                                                 
21 For the purposes of this paper, I assume that the CAB program is offered once and only once.  If the CAB were 
offered periodically, a landowner may find it optimal to delay his enrollment decision, even where, if his option 
value is positive. Western Economics Forum, Fall 2009 
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Figure 2. Landowner‘s Enrollment Decision and Payoff Structure 
 
 
Figures 3a and 3b represent the operation of a CAB program on a hypothetical landscape.  
Figure 3a shows parcels of land conditionally accepting the CAB offer.  That is, all parcels for 
which .  Figure 3b shows the parcels of land ultimately enrolled in the CAB program 
when the desired pattern of conservation is three or more contiguous units of land.  Any 
landowner not contiguous to at least two other parcels of land is released from his conditional 
enrollment. 
 
What should be clear is that the CAB program functions without the coordination of landowners.  
Each landowner‘s optimal strategy (accept if  and reject otherwise) is informed only 
by his own costs and .  Information about neighbors‘ willingness to enroll, represented by , 
is irrelevant.
22  Hence, the CAB can achieve desired patterns of spatially coordinated 
conservation without making any assumptions about the level of information available to 
landowners and their ability to cooperate. 
 
From the landowner‘s standpoint, the conditional agglomeration bonus improves upon the 
agglomeration bonus as it has been represented in the literature in two important ways.  First, 
the CAB simplifies the landowner‘s decision process by eliminating the need to coordinate one‘s 
decision with others.  Second, the possibility of coordination failure caused by uncertainty of 
neighbors‘ willingness to enroll is eliminated.  Wherever a group of landowners is each better off 






                                                 
22 Under a standard agglomeration bonus the size of p is relevant to the enrollment decision, and the functionality of 
the agglomeration bonus will depend on each landowner accurately determining p.  The information contained in p 
is complex: it is the joint probability of each landowner enrolling and it is endogenous.  
23 It is possible for some landowners to be thwarted by an irrational neighbor who does not enroll, but they will be 
no worse off than the status quo. Western Economics Forum, Fall 2009 
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Figure 3b. Parcels Enrolled (criterion of at least three contiguous parcels) 
 Western Economics Forum, Fall 2009 
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Applications to Conservation 
 
The ability of an incentive mechanism such as the agglomeration bonus to induce spatially 
coordinated land conservation does not alone recommend its application to conservation in the 
presence of threshold effects.  The appeal of an agglomeration bonus incentive to a budget-
constrained regulator will depend on how effectively it can be implemented.  Factors affecting 
the efficiency of conservation incentive mechanisms that have been discussed in the literature 
include offsite environmental benefits, relationships between alternative environmental benefits, 
the correlation between land value and environmental benefits, threshold effects, and slippage 
caused by output price effects (Babcock, et al., 1997; Wu, 2000; Wu, et al., 2000). 
 
Here the focus is on threshold effects and I assume that a single environmental benefit (e.g., 
habitat for a particular species) is being targeted.  Suppose that the marginal benefit of 
conservation exhibits threshold effects such that the benefit per acre of conservation ( ) is 
small until some threshold of contiguous acreage   has been conserved (see Figure 1).  A 
cost effective allocation of conservation funds will target low opportunity cost parcels of land that 
form contiguous areas . 
 
In the context of the previous section, the CAB successfully targets high-benefit/low-cost parcels 
by identifying all parcels for which   (see Figure 3a), and enrolling only those parcels 
that contribute to the formation of contiguous areas for which  (see Figure 3b).  From the 
standpoint of a regulator, the CAB improves upon a standard agglomeration bonus by 
eliminating the possibility of coordination failure, which could result in the enrollment of 
fragmented parcels of land with small benefits.  Allowing the final enrollment decision to be 
made after the spatial distribution of lower opportunity cost parcels is revealed enables the 
regulator to allocate funds exclusively to high-benefit contiguous parcels. 
 
A difficulty faced by the regulator is how to choose the size of the incentive .  If the regulator 
knows the distribution of opportunity costs he may predict how many landowners will 
conditionally accept his offer of .  However, the number of parcels that satisfy the desired 
pattern of enrollment, and are ultimately enrolled and compensated, is unknown without 
knowledge of the spatial distribution of low opportunity cost parcels.  For a given , a 
landscape with spatially correlated opportunity costs will tend to enroll a large number of parcels 
compared to a landscape with spatially fragmented opportunity costs.  Such uncertainty is likely 
to be problematic for a regulator facing a budget constraint. 
 
The use of auctions in conservation contracting has been proposed in the literature as a way to 
overcome information asymmetry between landowners and regulators (Latacz and Hamsvoort, 
1997; Romstad and Polasky, 2008).  An n-price auction could solve the regulator‘s information 
problem by inducing landowners to reveal information about their true opportunity costs prior to 
choosing .  In an n-price auction, the level of compensation is set equal to the highest 
accepted bid.  Each bidder has an incentive to bid his true reservation price because the level of 
compensation is independent of the size of the bid, except for the highest accepted bidder 
(Romstad and Polasky, 2008). 
 
An n-price auction applied to this hypothetical conservation problem would produce the same 
outcome as a CAB program whenever the highest accepted bid is equal to  .  The 
advantage of the auction is that it allows the regulator to set the level of compensation in 
accordance with his budget constraint.  With information about the level and location of 
landowner opportunity costs revealed by the bidding process, the regulator would be able Western Economics Forum, Fall 2009 
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determine the levels of enrollment and total compensation resulting from accepting 





The importance of considering threshold effects in the geographic allocation of funds to land 
conservation has been well demonstrated in the literature.  The agglomeration bonus is a 
targeting mechanism that attempts to spatially coordinate the allocation of conservation funds 
using a voluntary incentive mechanism.  The primary weakness of the agglomeration bonus as 
it has been represented in the literature is that it requires landowners to do the coordinating 
amongst each other.  Landowners may be able to coordinate enrollment decisions well, or 
poorly, depending on any number of conditions (e.g., the number of landowners involved).  
However, the possibility of coordination failure is always present and limits the mechanism‘s 
applicability to policy problems. 
 
The primary contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that spatially coordinated land 
conservation can be achieved without landowners coordinating their enrollment decisions.  
Because a landowner‘s enrollment decision under a CAB program is determined entirely by his 
private costs and benefits, the possibility of coordination failure caused by uncertainty about 
others‘ willingness to enroll is eliminated.  The elimination of coordination failure is attractive to 
both landowners and regulators.  A group of landowners will want to participate in conservation 
whenever doing so results in each being better off.  A regulator wants to enroll contiguous 
parcels of land while avoiding the enrollment of fragmented parcels. 
 
In the limited context of targeting an environmental benefit exhibiting threshold effects, the cost-
effectiveness of the CAB mechanism is attractive.  A CAB identifies the spatial distribution of the 
parcels of land with lower opportunity cost and only enrolls those that satisfy the desired spatial 
pattern of conservation.  That said, a host of other factors typically affect the cost-effectiveness 
of conservation strategies and a regulator must take those into account when considering a 
CAB.  In some cases, it may be possible to incorporate a CAB into other incentive mechanisms 
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